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 Abstract 
 
Samuel Laing was a key figure in propagating both an academically respectable defense 
of peasant proprietors and a critique of bureaucratic central government in Victorian 
Britain, his writings cited and argued with by John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Walter 
Bagehot, and John Austin (among others). This article corrects misapprehensions that 
Laing was a libertarian apologist for unfettered commercialism and complacent 
patriotism. It situates Laing in his argumentative contexts to show him as a critic of 
conventional political economy who called for a 'natural' society of self-governing 
freeholders, but gradually became ambivalently caught between a British commercial and 
aristocratic order and a continental model of greater property diffusion and strong 
central government. Laing's story sheds new light on the complex afterlives of republican 
and civic themes in nineteenth-century Britain, and their interaction with emergent 
concerns over the dangers to active citizenship of both wage labour in international 
markets and centralizing bureaucracies. 
 
 
 
 
  
After the freeholder: 
Republican and liberal themes in the works of Samuel Laing1 
 
 
I – Introduction 
 
The travel writer and translator Samuel Laing the elder is not a well-known 
figure in the pantheon of Victorian intellectuals, yet his writings, acknowledged to have 
been widely read in their time, have served in various ways to inform interpretations of 
British culture in the first half of the nineteenth century. Laing stands condemned as a 
capitalist philistine, holding a distaste for the fine arts thanks to their lack of economic 
utility that makes him a real-life instantiation of the attitudes of Dickens' Gradgrind.2 He 
has been recruited as exemplary of a group who defined civilization in 'liberal-capitalist' 
terms as revolving around mechanized factory production for export, thereby brushing 
off concerns over the superiority of certain European states to Britain in educational 
                                                 
1 My thanks go to Peter Mandler for comments on an earlier draft of this article, to Ruth 
Abbott for drawing my attention to Wollstonecraft, and to Thomas Hopkins for 
engaging discussion of Sismondi (and much besides). Any errors of interpretation are, 
however, entirely my own. The research for this article was supported by funding from 
the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ ERC grant agreement no 295463. 
2 Bernard Porter, '"Monstrous vandalism": capitalism and philistinism in the works of 
Samuel Laing', Albion, 23 (Summer, 1991), 253–68. 
standards and artistic production. 3  He has been cited as asserting the superiority of 
English over German national characteristics, and as a voice contributing to the growing 
British sense after 1848 that European peoples could not hope for political liberty via 
constitutional change alone, for they lacked the learnt capacity for self-government.4 It 
has also been noted that this libertarian and "free trader" developed his own personal 
theory of the importance of inheritance laws to social development, which informed the 
contrast in his earliest works between virtuous Norwegian peasant proprietors and the 
vice-ridden aristocratic society he depicted in Sweden.5 It is contended here that the 
picture thus built of Laing and his concerns is not just patchy but in many vital respects 
misleading, and that a more accurate and complete account of Laing's writings provides a 
useful window on to the relationship between earlier republican thought and Victorian 
liberalism.6  
Laing was far from being a straightforward apologist for commerce and 
manufacturing. His original ideal was a proprietary radicalism echoing earlier republican 
or civic humanist ideas of a political community of virtuous landholders, and involving a 
                                                 
3 Bernard Porter, '"Bureau and barrack": early Victorian attitudes towards the Continent', 
Victorian Studies, 27 (Summer, 1984), 407-433, 422. 
4 Peter Mandler, The English national character (New Haven and London, 2006), pp. 47–9; 
Jonathan Parry, The politics of patriotism (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 61-4. 
5 Bernard Porter, 'Virtue and vice in the North: the Scandinavian writings of Samuel 
Laing', Scandinavian Journal of History, 23 (1998), 153–72. 
6 It is important to note, however, that these misconceptions have not tarred the 
presentation in Elizabeth Baigent, ‘Laing, Samuel (1780–1868)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, (Oxford, 2004; online edn, May 2009), 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15891, accessed 22 March 2017]. 
profound ambivalence about commercial development, especially mechanized 
manufacturing and international trade. Laing's praise for Norway on the basis of the 
property diffusion created by its inheritance laws was not idiosyncratic, but a 
continuation of longstanding debates about the nature of post-feudal society. Laing 
contended that such a society should properly be one of freeholders whose 
proprietorship would equip them for self-government, rather than of wage labour under 
a mixed constitution. He restated a Scottish Enlightenment critique of primogeniture as 
contrary to natural law, and buttressed this with more novel arguments drawn from Jean-
Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi that subdivision of land would contain, rather 
than encourage, population growth. In this way Laing sought to break the alliance of 
political economy with aristocratic government that had been effected in an era of 
backlash against the French Revolution in the writings of Dugald Stewart, John Ramsay 
McCulloch, Thomas Robert Malthus, and Thomas Chalmers. Laing sought to show that 
in an age of rising democratic sentiment, European societies including Britain were 
tending towards the creation of independent small proprietors capable of controlling 
their interactions with the market, resisting faction, patronage, luxury, and tyranny, and 
enjoying a social cohesion and level of well-being explicitly more important than any 
increase of national wealth.  
Situating Laing in his argumentative contexts does not just allow us to get a 
more accurate picture of a corpus that quickly became a touchstone in Victorian debates 
over the land question. It also allows us to see more clearly the way that political 
economy after Adam Smith was mobilized for and against the idea of a landed 
aristocracy, a question that has often played second fiddle to that of how a liberal-
commercial consensus was formed out of radical, Whig, and evangelical Christian 
elements. It reveals too the way that Norway acted as an ongoing point of reference for 
discussing property diffusion and its relationship to liberty from the writings of Mary 
Wollstonecraft to the later nineteenth century. Above all, however, Laing's career and the 
way that his views altered over time strongly suggest routes forward for debates over the 
historical relationship between liberal and republican thought in the crucial period of the 
first half of the nineteenth century. 
Laing's writings tapped into longstanding conceptions of the connection 
between real property ownership and valid membership of the political community, 
while playing on ideas of the relationship between property and power that had shaped 
constitutional discussion since the wars of the mid-seventeenth century.7 It has long been 
understood that the country party ideal of the independent patriotic freeholder did not 
sit easily with more moderate, scientific, or sceptical Whig ideas of a commercial 
civilization refining citizens' manners through exchange. These ideas are often taken to 
be leading towards high-Victorian liberalism while aspects of the republican legacy fed 
into socialist and romantic resistance to the dominance of commerce, and redefinitions 
of the nature of virtue.8 At the same time it has been recognized that Victorian radical-
                                                 
7 See Richard Price, British society 1680–1880, (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 242-4; J. G. A. 
Pocock, The Machiavellian moment (Princeton, 1975). 
8 On the clash of commerce and civic humanism see Bianca Fontana, 'Whigs and 
Liberals', in Richard Bellamy (ed.), Victorian liberalism (London and New York, 1990), pp. 
42–57, p. 45; J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, commerce, and history (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 252–3, 
'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers', in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff 
(eds.), Wealth and virtue (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 235–52, pp. 242–3. On socialism see 
Gregory Claeys, Citizens and saints (Cambridge, 1989), 'The origins of the rights of labour: 
republicanism, commerce, and the construction of modern social theory in Britain, 
1796–1805', The journal of modern history, 66 (Jun., 1994), 249–90. On Coleridge see John 
Morrow, Coleridge's political thought (Basingstoke and London, 1990), though a perspective 
liberal ideas nevertheless paralleled in several ways those of earlier republican thought. 
The yeoman ideal persisted, and concerns with independence and civic activity merged 
into ideas of individuality and the importance of the cultivation of character, alongside 
hopes for political structures that diffused administration and decision-making. These 
afterlives have appeared so striking that republican and popular liberal values in the 
Victorian era have even been regarded as one and the same. 9  Yet if Laing further 
indicates that stories of the eclipse of republican values by liberalism appear untenable, 
he also indicates that the collection of examples from thinkers and popular movements 
to show the tenacity of republican values has the potential to overplay both continuity 
and the conceptual coherence of mid-Victorian liberalism. Perhaps most obviously, such 
continuity must be tempered by awareness of the way that during this period the 
conceptual connections between power and real property were, in various ways, breaking 
down. 
                                                                                                                                            
slightly less Pocockian is given in Pamela Edwards, The statesman's science (New York, 
2004) and taken up in David Craig, Robert Southey and romantic apostasy (Woodbridge, 
2007). 
9 See Eugenio Biagini (ed.), Citizenship and community (Cambridge, 1996), Liberty, 
retrenchment and reform (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 50–60, 84–93, 184–91; John Burrow, Whigs 
and liberals (Oxford, 1988), chapter four; Stefan Collini, 'The idea of 'Character' in 
Victorian political thought', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 35 (1985), 29–50; The 
final claim is made in Eugenio Biagini, 'Neo-roman liberalism: "republican" values and 
British liberalism, ca. 1860–1875, History of European Ideas, 29 (2003), 55–72. Such 
continuity has also been uncovered in Duncan Bell, The idea of Greater Britain (Princeton, 
2007), as 'civic imperialism'. 
Laing's views altered over the course of his writings from the mid-1830s to the 
early 1850s, in ways that are revealing of novel challenges facing the idea of 
proprietorship as a foundation for political stability, liberty, and popular virtue. The rise 
of mechanized manufacturing and its tendency towards the concentration of capital 
implied that the barriers to the diffusion of property were not simply those of the 
distortions of positive law, and indicated that the natural operations of markets might 
themselves be generators of new forms of dependence, hierarchy, and instability.10 At the 
same time Laing's distaste for the centralizing bureaucracies and state employment that 
he saw growing in Prussia and elsewhere led him in a very different direction, towards 
greater appreciation of the kind of civil liberty and personal independence that Britain 
had in fact managed to secure in spite of its 'feudal' structure of land ownership. As 
Laing identified both modern manufacturing and state patronage as updated forms of 
feudalism, new questions emerged from his original vision of locally self-governing 
freeholders about how to secure material independence for citizens at the mercy of 
fragile and distant markets for subsistence, and of how to protect these same citizens 
from 'over-government' by central agencies. Other authors' engagements with Laing 
show how this fissiparous set of concerns was widely cited, but as part of conflicting 
agendas, suggesting a story of republican values persisting within liberalism, but 
becoming attached to positions that were cleaving apart. 
                                                 
10 A shift that has been outlined more clearly by historians of America and France than 
of Britain. See e.g. James L. Huston, 'The American revolutionaries, the political 
economy of aristocracy, and the American concept of the Distribution of wealth, 1765–
1900', The American Historical Review, 98 (Oct., 1993), 1079–1105; Pierre Rosanvallon, The 
society of equals, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2013), p 29. 
A range of solutions to shoring up citizens' material independence in a world of 
technologically changing and internationally competitive market employment including 
free and standardized national education, trade unionism, and cooperative production 
would each come to prove divisive for liberal commentators. At the same time concerns 
over bureaucratic centralization and state power fed into a new libertarianism of which 
Spencer is the clearest example, that came to see independence more resolutely through 
the lens of a conceptual opposition between states and markets. To avoid a crude 
lumping of thinkers and to see the ways that the shifting circles of commitment making 
up the Venn diagram of Victorian liberalism did or did not overlap requires more 
detailed study of individuals and moments of argument between them. Recovering 
Laing's thought serves to show that whatever the practicability of making the freeholder 
the fundamental basis for political order in mid-nineteenth-century Britain, its appeal 
stemmed not least from offering a simple answer to the question of how to foster both a 
politically responsible populace and a stable economic base for democratic societies. In 
turn his splintered reception shows the difficulties that contemporaries faced in 
understanding what means and mechanisms might lessen the problems of a proletarian 
democracy, and the range of competing solutions that were in play. In an era of severe 
setbacks for both social democracy and a populace of savers, home-owners, and 
shareholders, such a story perhaps serves as a small reminder of how deep-seated are the 
hard choices that liberals seem likely to continue to face between the embrace of a 
capitalism that places workers in an internationally competitive structure of technological 
and contractual innovation, and the maintenance of a citizenry who feel empowered to 
regulate their collective political life. 
 
 
II – The natural law of succession 
 Laing was born in 1780, his father a merchant from Orkney. His brother 
Malcolm was eighteen years his senior, and when Samuel was still a young boy Malcolm 
had already passed through the University of Edinburgh and been called to the bar, 
going on to become a historian and critic of Macpherson's Ossian poems. Malcolm was a 
fearsomely radical Whig, a correspondent of Fox who had been a member of 
Edinburgh's Speculative Society alongside James Mackintosh (with whom he was close) 
and Benjamin Constant.11 Malcolm would at times return to Orkney, while Samuel went 
to Edinburgh himself to study in 1796–7. Samuel had imbibed Malcolm's radicalism in 
the early 1790s, but by 1816, after fighting through the peninsular war and having 
embarked on a life in commerce, he remembered his youth as a time of madness. There 
had been no alternative, Samuel now believed, between war with France and a revolution 
in Britain that would have risked the complete overturning of property.12 This retreat was 
of course a familiar refrain, echoing Mackintosh's more famous recantation in the late 
1790s from his earlier defense of the actions of the revolutionaries. Yet in the early 
1830s, two things happened to disturb Samuel's new and more peaceful existence. The 
liberalization of trade under the Tories hit the kelp-farming industry which provided him 
with his livelihood, and he failed to be returned to parliament as an avid reformer in an 
acrimonious election that saw him openly accuse the constituency's aristocratic patrons 
of improper collusion with the Lord Advocate (and editor of the Whig Edinburgh Review) 
                                                 
11 History of the Speculative Society of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1845), p. 24. 
12 Samuel Laing and R. P. Fereday, The autobiography of Samuel Laing of Papdale, (Kirkwall, 
2000), pp. 34–5. 
Francis Jeffrey. 13  His personal ambitions thwarted by the failure of liberal Tories to 
protect Orkney's industrial ecology and the power of Whig aristocracy over the Orcadian 
gentry's affairs, Laing had set out for Norway with a determination to connect with the 
Northern Isles' Viking roots. 
Norway was cheap, of historical interest for Orcadians, and appealing to a 
habitual traveller and linguist.14 It had also been noted before, in Mary Wollstonecraft's 
own highly popular account, as a society enjoying remarkable liberty thanks to the 
division of land into small farms.15 When his Journal of a residence in Norway was published 
in 1836, Laing was to reinforce Wollstonecraft's opinion at length. The Journal was a 
polemic operating on several fronts, but its primary target was the political economy of 
Chalmers, Malthus, and more broadly all those who sought to defend primogeniture, 
(including the Edinburgh Review). Laing portrayed Norway as a society shaped by the slow 
operation of its udal law of inheritance which subdivided property and supported the 
bonder class of small farmers. It was proof of a course of economic and social 
development which resulted from "the natural law of succession in equal shares", rather 
than "an artificial law of succession, such as the feudal law of primogeniture".16 The lack 
of easily-worked stone had saved the early Norwegian polity from internal conflict and 
                                                 
13 John Macaskill, 'The Highland kelp proprietors and their struggle over the salt and 
barilla duties, 1817–31', Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, 26 (July, 2006), 60–82; Laing 
and Fereday, Autobiography, pp. 216–28; Samuel Laing, Address to the electors of Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1833). 
14 Porter, 'Virtue and vice in the North', 155–6. 
15 Mary Wollstonecraft, Letters written during a sort residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark 
(London, 1796), pp. 75–6. 
16 Samuel Laing, Journal of a residence in Norway (London, 1836), pp. 480–1. 
feudalism by preventing the creation of private castles and encouraging chieftains to 
retire to ships and to pillage from the sea rather than set up competing strongholds 
within the country.17 The Norse had not been barbaric, but in their abolition of private 
war and their establishment of general laws had been in advance of Christian nations 
during the early Middle Ages.18 The ultimate result was an economy which gave a large 
number of families security in land from market employment's unpredictable vicissitudes, 
whilst avoiding the corrosive influence of aristocratic mores. There was widespread taste 
and leisure, sobriety, an intelligent cultivation including communal irrigation, a universal 
politeness superior to Britain, and a competence among Norwegian women who were 
actively involved in estate management.19  
The excellent Norwegian personality extended to their politics. The Norwegian 
constitution, framed in 1814 when Norway was messily ceded from Denmark to Sweden, 
leading to a union of crowns while Norway remained self-governing, provided a still-
living instantiation of the craze for liberty that had found expression in the United States 
and had swept across European states and their possessions after 1789. The Norwegian 
parliament or Storting was elected for three months by men over 25 who were burgesses 
or owned town-houses above a certain value, or who owned tax-paying land or rented it 
for life. From within the Storting was elected a Lagting, an upper chamber consisting of a 
quarter of Storting representatives. If three sittings of the assembly in a row agreed on a 
measure, they could overrule the king, and this was precisely what had occurred to 
abolish the status of the small hereditary nobility in Norway, in a move that had caused 
                                                 
17 Ibid., pp. 32–3; Snorre Sturlason and Samuel Laing, The Heimskringla, ed. Rasmus B. 
Anderson (4 vols., London, 1889), I, 150–2. 
18 Laing, Norway, pp. 210–11. 
19 Ibid., pp. 10–11, 39–40, 109–10, 137–9, 164–6, 170–1. 
much displeasure at the Swedish court.20 The Norwegians enjoyed total freedom of the 
press and had no tax on advertisements. Their public officials were regarded as servants 
of the people, and there was an absence of party spirit that might corrupt public opinion 
and prevent conscientious duty.21  
Sweden formed the contrast: "still under its ancien regime, while Norway is 
practically in advance of the age in the enjoyment of institutions favourable to political 
liberty."22 Manners and the upkeep of property were inferior, while the people were 
misled with a fondness for titles, and were incapable of comprehending the value of 
public opinion as a basis for political prestige.23 The government attempted ineffectually 
to control the press, irritating the public, and placed a needy nobility in civil and military 
posts, while the trades were controlled by incorporations, and the middle class thus 
suffered from a lack of prospects. 24  In keeping with a society made up of clearly 
differentiated ranks, the legislative diet represented corporate bodies including the 
nobility, clergy, burgesses, and peasants, which acted to defend their own interests.25 The 
Swedish constitution was thus full of checks, but poor at getting things done, and though 
the law was well-administered, bureaucracy hampered society's affairs.26 Overall, while 
the Swedes might have been cultured, literate, and highly educated, their civic and moral 
qualities were low thanks to the maintenance of a political system that limited their civic 
                                                 
20 Ibid., pp. 115–20; 128–30. 
21 Ibid., 133–4; 185-6. 
22 Ibid., p. 123. 
23 Samuel Laing, A tour in Sweden in 1838 (London, 1839), pp. 32, 64–5. 
24 Ibid., pp. 102–3, 284. 
25 Ibid., p. 293. 
26 Ibid., pp. 291, 296–7. 
involvement and civil rights, in a pattern intimately linked with the lack of diffused 
landed property. 
The framework informing Laing's contrast between Norway and Sweden has 
been noted as something of an oddity, but his central concern with inheritance laws had 
longstanding roots.27 These had formed an important aspect of the agrarian laws inspired 
by classical and Biblical sources put forward by republican thinkers at the time of the 
British Civil Wars.28 Their significance continued after the constitutional settlement of 
1688, as eighteenth-century country party authors sought to preserve balance within the 
existing constitution and resist the encroachments of those attached to the patronage of 
the court. In mid-eighteenth century Scotland, Lord Kames had united country party 
constitutional arguments with natural law in opposition to "feudal" institutions.29 Kames 
particularly disliked entail, which was rife in Scotland, and had tried unsuccessfully to 
secure its reform.30 It attempted to "tamper with the laws of nature" and "mend the laws 
of God". Property was a divinely ordained part of human nature, yet the use of money 
had created an endless hoarding appetite of "artificial wants" that went beyond 
rationality, and led men to desire the preservation of their estates after death, in defiance 
                                                 
27 cf. Porter, 'Virtue and vice in the North'. 
28 See Eric Nelson, The Greek tradition in republican thought (Cambridge, 2004), The Hebrew 
republic (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2010), chapter two; Pocock, Virtue, commerce, and 
history, The Machiavellian moment. 
29 See James Moore, 'Natural rights in the Scottish Enlightenment', in Mark Goldie and 
Robert Wokler (eds.), The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century political thought (Cambridge, 
2006), pp. 291–316, pp. 304-307. 
30 Alexander Fraser Tytler, Memoirs of the life and writings of the honourable Henry Home of 
Kames, (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1807), I, 226. 
of divine will. The children of small landholders were more industrious and inclined to 
education, thus providing more useful citizens than families exposed to "luxury and 
voluptuousness", while entail also sapped cultivators' motivation and credit. In politics 
too, overly concentrated property risked "feudal oligarchy". 31  In one sense Kames' 
project to rationally reform the law for commercial society coexisted uneasily with a 
concern that luxury depleted patriotism.32 Yet in the case of entail there was no such 
conflict: a post-feudal society of more divided land was both a jurisprudential aid to 
commerce, and a moral antidote to luxury's enervation. 
Kames' concerns were echoed by Adam Smith, whose Lectures on jurisprudence 
ramped up the rhetoric, with both primogeniture and entail famously condemned by 
nature, reason, and justice.33 The issue undergirded book three of the Wealth of nations, in 
which Smith explained the way in which the erosion of feudal power in Western Europe 
had occurred.34 The "natural law of succession" was division amongst all the children, 
                                                 
31 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Sketches of the history of man (4 vols., Dublin, 1774–5), IV, 
210–17. 
32 David Lieberman, 'The legal needs of a commercial society', in Hont and Ignatieff 
(eds.), Wealth and virtue, pp. 203–34. 
33 Adam Smith, Lectures on jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein 
(Oxford, 1978), p. 49. 
34 Book three has been widely discussed and the account here does not add to the 
combined analyses of Knud Haakonssen, The science of a legislator (Cambridge, 1981), 
chapter seven; Istvan Hont, Politics in commercial society, eds. Béla Kapossy and Michael 
Sonenscher (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2015), 
Jealousy of trade (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2010), chapter five, 'Adam Smith's history 
of law and government as political theory', in Richard Bourke and Raymond Geuss 
which prevailed when land was used only for enjoyment and subsistence, and had done 
so under the Romans.35 With the barbarian invasions that brought about the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire, land became the province of petty princes who used it as a 
basis of power and protection, kept in large parcels to prevent its ruination as small 
proprietors were marauded. Primogeniture had been joined by entail, both now otiose 
and harmful feudal remnants in an age of ample legal security for property. The 
extension of security of tenure and freedom from arbitrary taxes to a yeomanry who 
could obtain property and thus had the motivation to improve the land had taken much 
time and even now tenant farmers with long leases improved cultivation more slowly 
than motivated proprietors, for they were still liable to pay out part of their gains in a 
demotivating rent to the great lords.36 Thus the "natural inclinations of man" to cultivate 
the land, providing security from fragile foreign markets and a feeling of independence, 
had been thwarted by "human institutions" which monopolized agriculture, resulting in 
an "unnatural and retrograde order" of development. 37  Primogeniture continued to 
restrain this slow progress, which proceeded more rapidly in North America where small 
proprietors of land had cheaper opportunities of purchase and greater profitability.38 The 
                                                                                                                                            
(eds.), Political judgement (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 131–71; Donald Winch, Adam Smith's 
politics (Cambridge, 1978), chapter four.  
35 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature causes of the wealth of nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (2 
vols., Chicago, 1976), I, 408. 
36 Ibid., book three, chapter two. 
37 Ibid., book three, chapter one, quotes from 402. 
38 Ibid., 441–2. 
wealth of agriculture was more secure than that of commerce, so often dependent on 
foreign trade, which was easily destroyed by the effects of war.39 
Yet at the same time Smith's primary argument was that the complex 
emergence of modern liberty had rendered such issues relatively unimportant. The 
rebirth of international networks of commerce from urban centres, which created steady 
government within their walls and gained privileges from monarchs to counterbalance 
the great lords, had already effected an emancipation from feudalism.40 As landholders 
had begun to spend their wealth on manufactures instead of the maintenance of 
retainers, they had been forced into granting independence to their former retinues, and 
had lost the power of interfering with regular government. Thus the classic statement: 
"Having sold their birth-right, not like Esau for a mess of pottage in time of hunger and 
necessity, but in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the 
playthings of children than the serious pursuits of men, they became as insignificant as 
any substantial burgher or tradesman in the city."41 Further, Smith was not above making 
the argument that the requirement for the rich to find labourers to work their land and 
provide them with their "baubles and trinkets" ultimately led to a similar division of 
property as if it had been subdivided at the outset.42 This was a vision of wage labour, 
not broad proprietorship, as post-feudal liberty. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 445. 
40 Ibid., book three, chapter three. 
41 Ibid., 432–9, quote from 439. 
42 Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford, 
1976), part four, chapter one, section ten. See citation in Hont, Politics in commercial society, 
pp. 92–4. 
The ambiguity in Smith's work between primogeniture's rotten moral 
foundations and its decreasing practical harm in commercial societies did not settle any 
questions, but rather fuelled a fracturing in which his authority could support arguments 
for or against the maintenance of aristocratic estates. Smith can be seen as in agreement 
with Richard Price and Thomas Paine in their opposition to primogeniture, and was cited 
as an authority for Cobden's campaign for 'free trade in land' from the 1840s.43 Yet 
Smith's anti-mercantilist natural system of liberty also laid the foundations for an 
aristocratic-commercial opposition to the natural law of succession. In his De l'esprit des 
lois Montesquieu had suggested that in monarchies primogeniture and entail were to be 
favoured so as to ensure a hereditary nobility that could disseminate a necessary sense of 
honour and bind the people and their ruler.44 Montesquieu's argument for primogeniture 
was now to be reflected not only in the hugely influential writings of Burke, but also in 
the lectures of Dugald Stewart at Edinburgh in the 1790s on politics and political 
economy.45  
                                                 
43 Donald Winch, Riches and poverty (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 151–2; Anthony Howe, 'The 
'Manchester school' and the landlords: the failure of land reform in early Victorian 
Britain', in Matthew Cragoe and Paul Readman (eds.), The land question in Britain 
(Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 74–91. 
44 Montesquieu, The spirit of the laws, eds. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, 
Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge, 1989), book five, chapters five to nine. See also 
Annalien de Dijn, French political thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville (Cambridge, 2008). 
45 Richard Bourke, Empire and revolution (Princeton, 2015), pp. 19–20; Winch, Riches and 
poverty, pp. 180–2. For Stewart's use of the relevant theme in Montesquieu see Dugald 
Stewart, The collected works of Dugald Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, (11 vols., 1854–1860), 
IX, 359–61. 
Stewart cited Smith at length, and acknowledged the economic ill-effects of 
primogeniture and entail, yet he also made clear that "Some deviations from a perfectly 
free commerce of land may...be expedient to secure the independence of hereditary 
legislators, and to accomplish whatever other purposes of their order may accord with 
the essential spirit of the constitution", in a passage indicating clearly the need for 
primogeniture's preservation. "Wealth and population" had a "due subordination" to the 
"political arrangements on which the order of society depends", and the "perfection of 
our government" required among other things "a due respect to landed property, and to 
ancient establishments". 46 Stewart and his pupils have been presented as building on 
Hume and Smith to separate internal policies for increasing wealth from the study of 
forms of government, downplaying the latter's importance relative to the former, and 
paving the way for a Whig understanding of wise adaptation of the constitution to the 
commercially rising middle classes.47 Yet it has been less well-acknowledged that this 
involved sacrificing economic arguments to constitutional conservatism, explicitly 
favouring primogeniture's benefits in maintaining a mixed constitution over its 
commercial drawbacks. 
Stewart was joined by Malthus, who mulled the abolition of primogeniture as a 
means of rebalancing population towards agriculture and away from a manufacturing 
sector that was volatile and unhealthy, but who ultimately came to its defense, furthering 
arguments for the economic as well as the political expediency of bolstering large estates 
through positive law. Small properties limited scope for improvement, and gave an easy 
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ride to younger sons, damaging their enterprising ambition. As in Stewart and Burke, 
large estates supported the aristocratic element of mixed government, while they also had 
a role to play in keeping up an unproductive expenditure that could maintain displaced 
workers (like the unemployed servicemen of 1815), and dissipate excess capital that had 
no socially beneficial way of being invested.48 Malthus also argued that though workers 
might voluntarily limit family size and raise living standards in order to aim at 
respectability, such an effect would be created by civil liberties that depended on the 
constitution, which owed its excellence to a landed aristocracy. To abolish primogeniture 
would potentially destroy this engine of moral progress, and create a vacuum between 
the crown and the people, leading towards instability and military despotism. 49  The 
population question as presented by Malthus was to be linked even more directly to the 
distribution of land by others (including Malthus' successor at Haileybury, Richard 
Jones), with McCulloch prominently arguing in the Edinburgh Review that the subdivision 
of land led inexorably towards poorer agriculture and increases of population through 
lowered hopes of personal betterment, and that primogeniture in cases of intestacy was 
thus beneficial.50 
Malthus' focus on population, his account of the possibility of over-
accumulation, and his support for primogeniture were all taken up by Chalmers, who 
incorporated them into a theodicy which showed the mechanical operation of the rod of 
loving divine punishment in the laws of political economy, and meshed with the outlook 
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of liberal Tories. Over-population and gluts were not in themselves problematic: the 
system needed to be left to its catastrophic devices to help turn men's minds away from 
fleeting earthly gain.51 Yet as well as being theological, this idea was profoundly political 
in ways not as well-noted. Alongside recommending free trade, Chalmers suggested that 
since all taxes ultimately diminished rent but not profits or wages, they should be directly 
placed on net rent, removing the popular clamour for reduction of taxes, raising the 
visible importance of the aristocracy to its true level, and letting the damaging effects of 
over-speculation and over-population teach the people that only morality rather than 
reform of the state could solve their problems, thereby knocking the life out of 
democratic demagoguery.52 Chalmers also spilled much ink on emphasizing that moral 
reformation would be aided by the educative power of an established church (and that 
Smith's distinction between productive and unproductive occupations that had turned 
economists against the clergy was "nugatory in principle; and withal, mischievous in 
application").53 His defense of primogeniture was a natural extension of his views. There 
was no hope of ameliorating the people's condition by altered distribution of land: great 
estates furnished the tax to fuel the state, surplus rental income afforded "law, 
protection, and philosophy, and the ministry of religion, and art, and all that goes to 
decorate and to dignify human life", and (redolent of Montesquieu and Burke), 
aristocracy elevated the tone of society's manners and diffused a spirit of chivalry and 
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morality, maintaining a unified gradation of ranks towards the monarch.54 Moreover, 
even though Chalmers acknowledged that "a mighty force of sentiment and natural 
affection" was arrayed against primogeniture, the system should be upheld by giving 
younger sons employment as public functionaries in the church, army, or colleges.55  
Chalmers and Laing were both in certain respects descendants of Smith, yet 
were diametrically opposed. Laing's account of Norway's internal peace and the udal law 
makes sense as an offshoot of Smith's account, describing a world where the natural 
order persisted and its fruits could be seen. Laing agreed with Smith that a spirit of both 
independence and improvement was fostered by small landholdings, and favoured in 
both British and German contexts the cultivation of manufactures through the building 
of steady demand at home rather than jumping to export for foreign markets with their 
attendant insecurities of war.56 He made great use of the Smithian theme of unproductive 
expenditure to condemn the frittering away on services of national income that could 
otherwise be reproductively invested. 57  Laing also believed in rational assent to 
Christianity and voluntary organization of churches.58 Here Norway's state Lutheranism 
diverged from his preferences, but he claimed that the clergy's lack of representation as 
an order in Norwegian politics helped to limit dissent, while Sweden's strong church 
establishment evidently did not help popular morality (an argument backed up too with 
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reference to improving morals in America and France). 59  Pious conservatives were 
engaged in contradiction, holding back moral progress by denying people's independence 
of thought and self-provision of religious instruction.60 Thus "The cause of reform in 
church and state is the cause of morality all the world over."61 More offensive still about 
Chalmers was his linking of primogeniture with the creation of luxuries that helped to 
foster a moral atmosphere. Laing's prominent questioning of the value of the fine arts to 
the progress of civilization was not part of a dispute between capitalism and art, but one 
about the distribution of property in which Laing stood on the side of socioeconomic 
flattening, arguing that civilization did not stem from patronage, while his opponent was 
a key advocate of free trade, about which Laing was far more ambivalent. The accusation 
of blunt capitalist philistinism is even more out of place than this indicates since Laing 
overtly and consistently aimed at the general well-being of the population over the 
maximizing of national wealth.62 Laing regarded his works as contributing to the study of 
a "social economy" that incorporated political economy, but also factored in social and 
political institutions and a nation's overall happiness.63 
Both Malthus and Chalmers had made reference to Norway. Malthus had 
voyaged there in 1799, observing that the preventive check of delayed marriage was 
strong among Norwegians.64 He argued that this was largely due to the small amount of 
agricultural land in Norway and its absence of manufactures, meaning that house 
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servants had a clear view that they could not support a family until being raised by their 
farmer employers to a particular status that included a house of their own.65 Chalmers 
posited more simply that Norway represented the possibility of creating a moral 
peasantry.66 Against both these figures Laing sought to show that it was only from the 
holding of property that morality grew up, rather than its inculcation by a constitution or 
priesthood. The morality, manners, and standard of living of the Norwegian bonder were 
proof that "the influence of property upon the human mind" which encouraged a 
propensity to save and to keep up acquired tastes and habits, created "the real checks 
which nature has intended for restraining the propensity to propagation by improvident 
marriages". Thus "the diffusion of property through society is the only radical cure for 
that king's-evil of all feudally constructed societies,—pauperism and over-
multiplication."67 Agricultural proprietors could more easily plan families because they 
could immediately see what the land could produce, without factoring in rent, while 
agriculture on a large scale might be carried on like a manufacturing enterprise and thus 
glut the market, creating problems for redundant labourers as easily as manufacturing 
itself. 68  That "Dr. Chalmers and other eminent political economists" had proposed 
"bolstering up this unnatural structure of society", through a "fictitious moral restraint 
upon marriage", was "as contrary to political as it is to moral principle."69 Chalmers' 
recommendation of correcting for a lack of natural morality by employing younger sons 
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as functionaries was similarly reprehensible.70 Moreover, a lack of primogeniture had not 
in fact caused the endless subdivision of properties. An entirely natural combination of 
deaths, inter-marriages between landholding families, and the selling of land between co-
heirs to keep properties at an adequate size would neutralize the fears of Malthus and 
Chalmers. "An estate would no more be divided by heirs, than a ship is broken up and 
divided by heirs, unless it were the interest of the heirs to do so; and if so, society would 
be a gainer by it."71 When it came to Ireland, poor agriculture was not caused by divided 
inheritance, but by the lack of property rights on the part of the tenantry.72  
Despite having been under Danish rule for several centuries, controlled by a 
regime perhaps the most purely autocratic in Europe, Norway had also nevertheless 
rapidly put in place a constitution that was the envy of surrounding nations; the diffusion 
of property had secured civil liberties and smoothed the potentially treacherous path of 
political change. 73  The Norwegian constitution did not attest to the wisdom of its 
framers, but was rather "the superstructure of a building of which the foundations had 
been laid, and the lower walls constructed, eight centuries before by the ancestors of the 
present generation."74 There was a significant lesson to be drawn from this movement 
from "pure uncontrolled despotism to a government in which the legislative power is 
lodged entirely in the hands of the people". It showed that forms of government were of 
relative unimportance in shaping the conditions for liberty, and that political systems 
"operate according to the state of property and enlightenment of a people". Thus  
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 a nation may practically be in the enjoyment of civil rights, free 
institutions, property, security, and all the blessings of liberty in 
all that affects the well being of the many, under an absolute 
monarch, and may practically be destitute of all these 
advantages of liberty, as for instance in Ireland, although living 
under a form of government in which the people elect their 
own legislature.75  
 
Norway's success undermined Malthus' claims that constitutions created 
independence and self-respect. Though apparently similar to Dugald Stewart's conceptual 
separation of forms of government from internal policies of enlightenment and 
commercial development, Laing's was a subtle reversal, the internal policy not the 
promotion of exchange under mixed government, but a subdivision of property eroding 
aristocracy.  
Laing was particularly unimpressed by arguments about the need for a second 
chamber with a distinct existence and by the whole concept of the representation of 
different orders as promulgated by figures like the reformed Mackintosh, as out of 
keeping with the idea of a unified wise and virtuous public opinion.76 The issue came to 
the fore as part of a dispute between Laing and the Swedish ambassador to the British 
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court, Count Björnstjerna.77  Björnstjerna had argued that a representative democracy 
with only one chamber would be locked in conflict with a monarch leading to either 
absolutism or anarchy. Laing retorted that while "This Swedish statesman tells the world 
that the Norwegian constitution is bad, because Aristotle and Cicero, Bacon and 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Madison, Jeremy Bentham and Sismondi, Tocqueville, and 
Guizot, and himself, are all master-minds" who had declared against single chambers, 
nevertheless the Norwegian constitution showed by its own operation that it functioned, 
convening independently of royal assent, and containing the check that the same triennial 
assembly could not both propose and enact legislation.78  
It was an important part of Laing's argument to show that this more democratic 
government could be reached peacefully, and at the outset of the Journal he had drawn 
the attention of the "political philosopher" to the way that Norway's legal and social 
arrangements had allowed it a recent "transition from despotism to democracy" that 
"was unmarked by any convulsion, or revolutionary movement".79 A key point here was 
that with the abolition of primogeniture in the United States, the instituting of 
compulsory divisions of inheritance in France under the code civil, and the sweeping away 
of the vestiges of serfdom in Prussia under the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg, Laing 
thought that the law and the public opinion that shaped the law were now in the process 
of gradually creating the Norwegian outcome everywhere. Norway showed "on a small 
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scale, what America and France will be a thousand years hence."80 In Britain, it was 
"impossible" that the "constitution of civil society can long exist without some great 
convulsion, unless mankind be retrograding to the state in which the feudal law of 
primogeniture originated. If society and the ideas of mankind are advancing in a different 
direction, it would be wise if legislation were to precede, rather than be forced to 
follow." 81  In Laing's account, democracy appeared as the outcome of respect for 
property rights, rather than conjuring images of revolutionaries undermining the 
structure of civilization that had created such a backlash in the 1790s by alarmed Whigs 
like Arthur Young.82 Laing could also re-emphasize the maxim that "property is power": 
that "Property and power necessarily go together."83 The strong conceptual connection 
between the distribution of property and the working of constitutions might have been 
losing ground (to utilitarianism, entangled ideas of both ancient and universal political 
rights, and other tendencies), but in 1836 Laing was far from unusual in cleaving to it. A 
year earlier Alexis de Tocqueville had pointed out that inheritance laws "belong, it is true, 
to the civil order; but they ought to be placed at the head of all political institutions, for 
they have an incredible influence on the social state of peoples, of which political laws 
are only the expression...The legislator regulates the estates of citizens once, and he rests 
for centuries...the machine acts by its own force".84 In the British parliament Robert 
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Inglis claimed in debate over primogeniture that "the real question is, whether the House 
of Lords is to be overthrown or destroyed", in essential agreement with Paine's statement 
that "Establish family justice, and aristocracy falls".85  
There are extremely strong indications that Laing's polemic benefited from 
reading Sismondi, who as Mackintosh's brother-in-law shared Laing's extended social 
circle. Sismondi was also a republican engaged with problems thrown up by book three 
of the Wealth of nations.86 His Nouveaux principes d'économie politique would have furnished 
Laing with his crucial and consistent argument that peasant proprietors limited family 
size and that spiraling population growth was due to proletarianization and dependence 
on uncertain demand which made accurate estimates of one's future status impossible.87 
Sismondi had explicitly stated that Britain should use its remaining common lands to 
recreate a yeomanry.88 He would also have provided arguments for peasant proprietors' 
relative morality and peacefulness in moments of dramatic political transition, while like 
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Laing Sismondi believed that government should avoid religion and education. 89 
Sismondi's overall outlook that the problems facing contemporary European societies 
involved weighing up the moral and material benefits of broad property distribution with 
the benefits brought by the progress of exchange and the division of labour, with 
national wealth not necessarily in step with national happiness, can be glimpsed 
throughout Laing's works. The key difference was that for Sismondi there was no single 
solution to this balancing act, there was simply the need for government (of a pluralistic 
mixed sort), to cautiously regulate individual actions that might, by creating imbalances in 
the delicate reciprocal relations of population, consumption, and investment, harm the 
general good.90 Laing's aim was almost the reverse: to find a natural unity in civil society 
as a potentially stable antidote to political uncertainties and the progress of democratic 
sentiment. This was perhaps inevitably to run into the kinds of problems that Sismondi 
had already addressed concerning the growth of the factory system, with more added 
when it appeared that peasant proprietors were not necessarily the sources of civic virtue 
that Laing had hoped. 
 
 
III – Functionarism and natural aristocracy 
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After his works on Norway and Sweden, Laing's horizons broadened to other 
states, and in the process began to betray a concern that post-revolutionary societies 
contained threats to the formation of independent citizens that were not dependent on 
the balance of property ownership. Both centralized government and the factory system 
were christened as successors to feudalism, and in the process Laing's ideas about how to 
achieve political change became more complex and conflicted. As he turned to France 
and Prussia in his Notes of a traveller his earlier themes recurred: he wrote at length 
explaining that French prosperity was based on the new subdivision of property.91 Yet 
where the writings on Norway and Sweden had formed a simple contrast of freeholding 
and aristocratic societies, Laing now embarked on the attempt to show how individual 
states were being shaped by a contest between the beneficial power of property and the 
obstructive "kingly power". The autocracies, headed by Austria, were a clear-cut form at 
the other end of the spectrum to Norway, yet in France and the German lands there was 
a new situation, whereby monarchy and a regime of limited civil liberties were no longer 
supported by aristocratic principles, but by a regime of state functionaries.92 As well as 
dismantling the supports of aristocratic society, the French Revolution had created an 
administration geared to military power and keen efficiency in law, police, and public 
business under a spirit of system that ground down civil liberty and public spirit.93 The 
state had "stepped into the shoes of the feudal baron on the abolition of the feudal 
system."94  
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Even more worrying for Laing than developments in France, which seemed 
likely to be broken up with time as the effects of altered inheritance continued to play 
out, was the nature of the Prussian state as it attempted to forge a true unity across its 
territories. Prussia combined compulsory military service, an education system that made 
functionaries of professors (who formed stultifying intellectual schools instead of 
sharpening minds), the joining of Lutherans and Calvinists in a Prussian church, and a 
customs union attempting to mold German economic development to Prussian ends.95 
Across all these fronts, Prussia was violating principles of religious and educational 
voluntarism, localism, productive spending in a Smithian mode, and the natural 
harmonious growth of production and consumption, agriculture and manufacturing. 
Overall, Prussia was a land of contradictions, between censorship and high levels of 
education, strong religion and interference with its observances, upright morals and the 
intermeddling of the state, and where wealth and happiness competed with ruinous 
demands on time and labour from government restrictions and the military.96  Laing 
mused that in the long-term Europe might reach a rational form of government as a 
continent-wide federalism replaced competing, artificially constructed monarchies, yet 
the actual direction of developments in Prussia and elsewhere was not hopeful. 97  It 
remained to be seen whether the functionary regime was a last adaptation of artificial 
feudality, or represented a more significant brake on the progress of liberty.  
This was a concern linked not just to individual character but to the effects of 
changing social structure on political cohesion as the danger arose of an entirely new 
class of state employees. Laing was partaking in the formation of an emergent 
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realignment of concerns that was leading to a new language in British politics of 
"interference" in civil society by a "central" government.98 The concern was sharpened by 
noises coming from the British parliament. Laing saw local administration as connecting 
the elements of society in a single functioning community, and the movement begun by 
the Whigs in the 1830s towards more central administration as having undermined 
national cohesion in Britain, at the expense of the gentry. Although the old poor law 
might have been faulty, and there might be problems with grand juries and unpaid 
county magistrates, without these three "the whole body of English gentry might fly up 
to the moon some evening...and not be missed by the other classes."99 The sundering of 
communal ties of local government endangered the state by creating greater class 
separation, as well as paid administration encouraging unproductive expenditure of 
capital. 
In making such points, Laing was no longer writing about societies produced by 
the long course of centuries under natural or feudal systems. The contemporary struggle 
of forces was not just a clash of two powers of property and monarchy, but involved two 
distinct causal ideas about the foundations of political freedom. Property ownership 
aided the growth of habitual powers of self-government which sustained liberty, but 
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these habits could also be disrupted by the legislative attitudes of states. Laing now made 
clear that the absence of state intervention itself helped to create a spirit of personal 
autonomy—an idea potentially separable from concerns over material independence.100 
The libertarian edge of Laing's republican ideas was thus capable of taking on a life of its 
own, separate from ideas of property distribution. In this way, despite worrying signs, 
Britain could appear more as a healthy exception to emergent European problems, rather 
than the continent's aristocratic throwback. If England was lacking in natural liberty, it 
was alive with a spirit of independence thanks to a comparative lack of functionaries and 
interference in daily life (best exemplified in the passport system Laing despised in 
France). The young in Britain did not as yet consider it reasonable to spend their youth 
trying by any means to wriggle their way into state appointments when they could be 
learning to be productive.101 
Yet at the same time a different critique fell more heavily on Britain than its 
neighbours—if the latter sinned by denying proprietors their freedoms, the British were 
moving from a regime of proletarian field labour to another, yet more hazardous, in the 
factory system. Laing was not opposed to manufacturing per se.102 In cities like Stockholm 
and Edinburgh its absence clearly damaged the living standards of the poor.103 Yet in 
keeping with his general claims regarding independence and proprietorship Laing viewed 
the happiness of the people as best served not by maximizing productivity, but "the wide 
distribution of employment over the face of a country by small but numerous masses of 
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capital". 104  Mechanized manufacturing naturally tended towards the concentration of 
capital through the cheapness of larger scale production. As a consequence, the operative 
had no chance of raising his condition to one of independence.105 Moreover, unlike for 
Sismondi, who had seen manufacturing as a problem requiring management through the 
wisdom of legislation, this problem presented itself to Laing as a flaw in the "natural" 
order meant to create harmony independently of positive law: "A vassalage in 
manufacture and trade is succeeding the vassalage in land, and the serf of the loom is in a 
lower and more helpless condition than the serf of the glebe; because his condition 
appears to be not merely the effect of an artificial and faulty social economy, like the 
feudal, which may be remedied, but to be the unavoidable effect of natural causes."106  
The implications of this line of thinking were enormous. The unchecked 
development of this natural "feudalisation" would lead to "a structure of society" arising 
"in which lords and labourers will be the only classes or gradations in the commercial 
and manufacturing, as in the landed system." In glass, iron, soap, and cotton, exclusive 
family properties appeared to be destroying competition. Considering solutions, it 
seemed unlikely to Laing that joint-stock companies of small capitalists could compete 
with great capitals in the hands of those "wielding great means with the energy, activity, 
and frugality of an individual."107 This last was a point indebted to Smith, who had 
directly compared the ineffectiveness of joint-stock company directors with that of a rich 
man's stewards: like feudal tenants both lacked true motivating interests in the success of 
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their respective enterprises.108 The benefits of individual proprietorship thus came into 
intractable conflict with the well-being of the populace. 
Laing was broadly optimistic that manufacturing greatness like that of Britain 
would prove more lasting than the evanescent commercial greatness of the Dutch 
Republic, yet there were signs that such optimism might be misplaced. 109  He also 
conjured a dystopian vision of England's future inspired by the faded surroundings of 
the Italian city-state of Genoa. The outlay of the Genoese on sumptuous architecture 
showed how "the misapplication of capital, or rather of human industry...is the cause of 
instability of greatness in empires, as in individuals". Their palaces were a mark of their 
decline, and England too, with its manufacturers' naturally increasing family wealth, 
might come to spend the resources that could be used for fertile investments to create a 
decayed realm of patronage and splendour alongside rags and hunger.110 With Sismondi's 
analysis of the potential mismatches between supply, demand, and population at hand, 
Laing could see in the rise of large-scale manufacturing the danger of Britain's fall from 
international preeminence, not through luxury overcoming martial virtue as certain 
earlier republicans had suggested, so much as through accumulated profit destroying the 
foundations of sustainable productive activity for the whole population, though in this 
way still undermining the foundations of popular self-rule and social stability. 
Laing's writings thus came to a dilemma caused by increasing unease as to 
whether Norway really did represent the long-term future of European societies: the 
British path of development appeared to fail in the provision of material independence 
and encourage population growth, while the emergent forms of government on the 
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Continent appeared to hamper civil liberties and habits of personal autonomy. Neither 
seemed assured of providing lasting stability or prosperity. Initially Laing continued to 
hold to the idea that Britain's best course would be to follow Europe's movement 
towards a post-aristocratic order, in tandem with a more general movement of history. 
He hitched his pleas for changes to inheritance laws in Britain to repeal of the Corn 
Laws, suggesting that both would aid the deflation of artificially high land prices, and 
would help to cause "an inevitable change in the state of landed property" in Britain to 
create a combination of small proprietors and metayers. The latter would then have the 
security against foreign commerce of paying landlords in a proportion of produce rather 
than cash linked to fluctuating prices that encouraged speculative farming for global 
markets and decreased chances of sound family planning. 111  As well as taking up 
Sismondi's analysis of the perils of dependence on international trade, this was one 
answer to the problem the Swiss author had outlined that English agriculture could not 
easily compete with metayer and serf cultivation that did not rely on market prices to 
remunerate workers.112 Overall, Laing was still attempting to envision Britain returning to 
a path of natural development, and the decoupling of the peasantry from international 
commerce, with the aim of maximizing happiness and well-being rather than national 
prosperity.113  
In 1850 Laing was less sure of the right course. The crucial turning point had 
been the revolutionary disturbances of 1848, which appeared to show the inherent 
instability of continental regimes and the relative success of Britain in avoiding its own 
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proletarian problem, as well as displaying the strength of socialist ideas with which Laing 
had little sympathy. Laing was now deeply conflicted, and was prepared to expand his 
sense of the importance of the gentry into more general statements about the importance 
of an intermediate order between the governing and the governed with moral influence 
over both, that echoed the ideas of Malthus about the role of an aristocracy in mixed 
government.114 Laing suggested that without such a third element in society, there would 
be an oscillation between tyranny and anarchy, directly using the language that 
Björnstjerner had used against him some ten years earlier. All Germany had was its 
functionary class, and all France had to mediate between people and state was Paris. In 
Britain, wrote Laing, this third class was formed by capitalists and landowners, but 
Europe lacked an equivalent, and was being led to ideas of a total equality of the mob 
that endangered liberty.115 Laing also now suggested that the social states of Norway, 
Flanders, and Switzerland were stationary rather than progressive, and as such were more 
suited to the fourteenth century than the nineteenth—the lack of concentrated capital 
limited demand and though it created a "happy social state", it was "a philosophy of 
barbarism, not of civilisation".116 Problems were also visible in France, where the new 
inheritance laws had led to heirs taking on debt to buy out their siblings, which was 
becoming unmanageable. 117  Though Cobden and others might have thought that 
diffusing property would usher in peace, the French peasant proprietors' sons were eager 
to join the army.118 On the eve of another Bonaparte's rise to power Laing began to 
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sound remarkably like Malthus on military despotism, even if his diagnosis was very 
different. The revolutions had been directly caused by a social structure which created 
unemployment, and a lingering historical taste in luxuries whose production failed to knit 
together customer and worker in the same way as higher volume and more frequently 
purchased goods.119 Discontent in Germany and the failure to frame a liberal political 
settlement had also been caused by the simultaneous cultural power and political 
impotence of the teaching class created by national education systems.120 Laing issued a 
confession: "observers of the spirit of the age, who augured, from the general diffusion 
of landed property through the social body, a happy, enviable, and hitherto unknown 
state of society, and hailed the approach of the Saturnia Regna in the new social state into 
which Europe has entered, must confess their disappointment at its results."121 
Laing was not, however, making a total volte face in favour of Britain's 
exceptionalism; the underlying point was that the question of how precisely to foster a 
spirit of self-government was becoming vastly more difficult wherever Laing looked. He 
saw "The social body on the Continent" as "in a transition state" between "old 
institutions" which had "withered away", and new ones that had "not yet taken root and 
unfolded themselves".122 Moreover the "Old abuses cannot be removed without a shock 
to the social system, without a reaction which may involve a generation in the misery of 
civil war and anarchy" although, as with the Reformation, which Laing thought "trifling" 
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by comparison with the nineteenth century, he believed that "the ultimate results may be 
good".123  
Precisely what the new institutions might be was unclear, but there were 
possibilities. Free trade in corn had allowed Britain to feed more mouths and avert an 
agrarian war, yet the same solution in Europe would risk further social disruption and 
distress. Free trade was not a universal solution. Rather, in a state like Denmark, 
protectionism could be an entirely sensible option to ensure employment to the children 
of peasant proprietors while avoiding runaway population growth like that caused by 
factory labour.124 Policy required regional sensitivity. Laing also developed further the 
notion he had previously entertained that guild restrictions on trades were not necessarily 
a poor idea, and rested on notions of occupations as a form of property found in almost 
all times and places apart from modern Britain, paralleling Sismondi's questions of how 
the labourer might find property in his work. Laing could now speak positively of the 
future potential of trade unions, which he had previously seen as brakes on productivity. 
For both Britain (where population growth was still a concern) and Europe, the rise of 
operatives as an apparently permanent interest group created fundamentally new 
questions about how citizens might be shielded from markets.125 Yet nowhere was there 
a clear route towards the stable combination of widespread proprietorship, domestically-
led demand, and local administration. 
Laing's legacy was as ambiguous as this suggests, fostering support for peasant 
proprietors, posing the question of how to retain independence in the face of large-scale 
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production, and providing fodder for those who wished above all to safeguard citizens' 
initiative by limiting the sphere of state action. Each of these was about maintaining a 
virtuous and active populace, yet this did not mean that they all pointed in the same 
ideological directions. If opposition to primogeniture had been widespread in France 
during this period, Laing had clearly been important in putting it back on the map in 
Britain. 126   His early writings contributed to the mid-Victorian movement that saw 
support for small landholdings and spade husbandry gain academic respectability over 
the course of the century, Cobbett's idealization of the yeoman and Feargus O'Connor's 
land plan giving way to the writings of J.S. Mill, William Thomas Thornton, J. E. 
Thorold Rogers and others, the speeches of Cobden and Bright, and Gladstone's own 
praise for a variety of sizes of farms. 127  Laing's arguments on population helped to 
convince Mill of the viability of peasant proprietors, his writings preceded Cobden's land 
campaigning (Cobden calling Laing his "beau ideal of a traveller for describing a modern 
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social phase of society"), while Thornton saw "the well-known traveller" as the founder 
of the movement in favour of peasant proprietors in Britain.128 In particular, Laing's use 
by Mill and Thornton aided their concerted arguments of the late 1840s against the 
backdrop of the Irish famine, which focused attention and led to support for peasant 
proprietorship in Ireland from a range of journals, acting as a key tipping point in 
discussion.129 Laing's views on Norway remained sufficiently authoritative to be worth 
refuting in the 1880s.130 Yet Laing's later works made him a troublesome ally for land 
reformers. In the third edition of his Principles of political economy of 1852 Mill had to add a 
lengthy argumentative footnote suggesting that Laing's earlier opinions on Norwegian 
prosperity was more reliable than his later assessment of the state of the French 
peasants.131  
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Laing's question of how independence could be made compatible with 
manufacturing also lurked in the background of Mill's support for producer cooperatives, 
allowing for independence in the context of large-scale production.132 In a further mark 
of the ambiguities that emerged in Laing's work and the way it was co-opted, he was also 
cited on the feudal conditions of English factories by the American protectionist Henry 
Carey, who wanted to see an end to British dominance of international trade and a 
reuniting of producers and consumers in domestic markets.133 In turn, William Stanley 
Jevons recalled Laing primarily for his assertion that every country had its own political 
economy, situating him in a tradition of historical and inductive economic reasoning that 
was being reasserted in the 1870s, a reassertion that would in turn open the way for 
British arguments for tariff reform.134 
Laing's works were yet more important in fostering discussion over potential 
problems with bureaucracy and central administration. As early as 1844 Mill had 
suggested to Sarah Austin that he would like to hear her husband's view of Laing's 
writings. 135  When John Austin published on "centralization" in 1847, Laing was the 
British author reviewed alongside three French names, and bore the brunt of Austin's 
utilitarian ire over confusions between ideas of over-government and central 
government.136 Austin had little patience with Laing's ideas of the political significance of 
social structure and the development of character. He translated Laing's statement that a 
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country with formal political liberty could lack civil liberties into banality: of course 
popular government could be restraining to its population. Austin pithily summarized 
against Laing the utilitarian idea that liberty and restraint were merely tools of attaining 
the general good, and that "It is only by abridging their natural liberty, that the state can 
secure to its subjects the enjoyment of their legal rights—including their right to the 
remnant of natural liberty which it tacitly permits them to retain." 137  Yet few mid-
Victorian liberals were so dismissive about the ramifications of professional 
bureaucracies, and Austin did not prevent Laing being taken seriously. 
 Laing's account of 'functionarism' was taken up by an ascendant set of authors, 
all connected with The Economist, who were deeply concerned with fostering a popular 
character that could support free government, while jettisoning support for peasant 
proprietors (and, incidentally, each expressing scepticism over Mill's producer 
cooperatives). William Rathbone Greg used Laing's later writings to denounce the 
militarism and stationariness created by the subdivision of property, also arguing against 
the idea that small-scale agriculture provided real productivity gains over large farms. 
Having dispensed with this issue he could go on to reproduce at length Laing's 
arguments against bureaucratic administration, state education, and any involuntary 
military service, writing that "it is perfectly evident that republicanism and functionarism 
are incompatible existences...The one assumes that the people can govern themselves, 
the other that they cannot; the one supposes the people to be wiser than their rulers, the 
other supposes the rulers to be wiser than the people".138 Not least among Greg's targets 
was Joseph Kay, a widely read author on the social question with the ear of prominent 
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Whigs who had argued in Laing's wake that Britain could learn from Prussia in terms of 
diffusing property to promote a conservative peasantry, but also in instituting national 
education. 139  While the apparent conservatism of the French peasant proprietor was 
critiqued in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire, certain British thinkers concerned about the 
coming of democracy were prepared to continue the line of Sismondi and the early Laing 
that smallholders' scepticism of revolution was a positive boon.  By contrast Greg (who 
was a fixture of the Edinburgh) argued that real conservatism and stability emanated from 
an aristocracy.140  
Greg's brother-in-law Walter Bagehot cited Laing at length in his English 
constitution as showing that bureaucracies were by their nature not geared to efficiency, but 
their own perpetuation, and tended to shut down questioning of established practices. 
For Bagehot the best administration of government departments would mirror that of 
the most highly valued joint-stock companies, coming from versatile men without any 
specific training or body of knowledge but who could fulfil "animating" and "critical" 
functions. 141  Less Whig and more radical, Herbert Spencer also reviewed Laing 
sympathetically to discuss the dangers of "over-legislation" and the vital causal 
significance of the state's interaction with its citizens in forming character, agreeing that 
"In the order of nature, a capacity for self-help must in every case have been brought 
into existence by the practice of self-help". Laing's writings proved the "progressiveness 
of a self-dependent race, and the torpidity of paternally-governed ones".142 In each of 
                                                 
139 Joseph Kay, The social condition and education of the people in England and Europe (2 vols., 
London, 1850). 
140 Greg, Essays on political and social science, I, 158–61. 
141 Walter Bagehot, The English constitution, ed. Miles Taylor (Oxford, 2001), pp. 140–4. 
142 Herbert Spencer, 'Over-legislation', Westminster Review, 60 (Jul., 1853), 51–84, 82. 
these cases there was a principled standpoint which could serve to critique trends in the 
British state, yet there was also a presentation of continental regimes as the undesirable 
foil for the analysis. This moment has been described as one in which ideas of liberty as 
created by constitutions gave way to ideas about the political importance of popular 
character. 143   Yet if this was the case for certain thinkers, in the case of Laing the 
movement was rather from an idea of character as formed by proprietorship towards one 
in which character was formed more by the action of the state, in fact making the long-
term effects of the arrangement of government appear more significant, and this was 
echoed by those who cited him.  
Overall, Laing had put a powerful and simple case for what a stable transition 
towards a virtuous democratic society would look like. This case avoided questions that 
animated many of Laing's contemporaries as to how a national church, national 
education, or aristocratic influence might secure social cohesion. Yet Laing's alternative 
of creating a civic population through the diffusion of property was hard to hold on to. 
As Laing's hopes that individuals might regain a measure of self-sufficiency in a post-
feudal age receded, his concerns merged into the separable questions of how the 
disempowering conditions of wage labourers might be mitigated, and how to temper the 
power of overbearing state apparatuses. It is only through awareness of the variety of 
debates that were thereby thrown open that we can understand the way that nineteenth-
century thought continued and adapted the themes of civic activity bequeathed by an 
earlier period, while also posing questions that were to be taken up by social democrats 
and market libertarians. 
There is also a sense in which the writings of Samuel Laing allow us to see more 
clearly some of the problems facing the wide range of nineteenth-century thinkers who 
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addressed the question of what self-government in large states might require or mean 
amid the huge upswing of technologically-driven international trade in the nineteenth 
century that helped to create certain key constraints of contemporary politics. In what 
ways might a democracy of individuals living hand to mouth and without the time, 
inclination, or conception of their own stable interests to join a long-term collective 
project of self-government be offset or avoided? How could one imagine a route towards 
a historical future that did not involve a political system at constant risk of bitter division 
into factions with competing material interests shaped by events going on beyond the 
bounds of national control? Much of this discussion, which is in key respects still our 
own, remains  to be fully parsed by historians of political thought. 
